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Executive summary 
This submission proposes terminating Australia’s older-style BITs or 
renegotiating and replacing them with new agreements that contain safeguards, 
including the exclusion of investor-state dispute settlement, that will protect the 
Australian government’s capacity to regulate or take measures to address 
climate change and its effects. 
1. Introduction 
This submission addresses the following questions proposed for consideration by the August 
2020 Discussion Paper published by DFAT (‘the Discussion Paper’): 
 Do you have concerns about Australia’s existing BITs? If so, please comment on any 
specific provisions of concern. 
 If Australia took the approach of re-negotiating at least some of the existing BITs, do 
you have views on which clauses should be included in a renegotiated agreement? 
 In your view, does the existence of a BIT impact on the flow of foreign direct 
investment and/or portfolio investment? Please comment, if possible, both generally 
and with reference to specific existing BITs. 
2. Concerns about Australia’s existing BITs 
As observed by the Discussion Paper, the BITs to which Australia is currently a party, which 
came into force between 1988 and 2009, ‘contain relatively broadly drafted provisions and do 
not contain the explicit safeguards generally included in more modern treaties’. As the Philip 
Morris plain packaging dispute demonstrated, this leaves legitimate regulatory measures taken 
by the Australian government open to challenge by investors. Even if Australia would win all 
of any such claims, they are nevertheless expensive to defend. Defeating the Philip Morris 
claim, for example, cost Australia AU$24 million, not all of which was recoverable.1 
Additionally, Australian cannot take for granted that it will keep winning such cases in light of 
the unpredictability of tribunals and the suspicion they have at times shown towards state 
regulatory measures. 







While the Discussion Paper acknowledges that Australia’s modern Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) practice seeks to protect against investors challenging public health measures, this 
submission proposes that the same be done in respect of measures relating to climate change. 
Such measures could be defined to include measures taken to, for example, further the 
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement,2 transition to renewable energy or 
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions. 
There are a multitude of reasons that dictate particular emphasis on climate change when it 
comes to Australia’s BIT policy. The first reason is that unlike in other policy areas, there is 
overwhelming scientific consensus in regards to the existence of climate change, its 
anthropogenic character, and the fact that radically reducing and eventually eliminating 
greenhouse gas emissions is necessary for any solution. Australia relied heavily on 
overwhelming scientific consensus in regards to the negative effects of smoking and the 
benefits of plain packaging in its prolonged multi-forum litigation against Philip Morris. 
Therefore, it would be consistent to do so in regard to climate change as well. Additionally, the 
gravity and urgency of climate change mean that even short delays owing to ongoing 
investment litigation and/or concerns about the possibility of such litigation will have important 
— even irreversible — negative effects. 
The threat of investors challenging climate change measures is not theoretical. For example, 
TransCanada brought a US$15 billion claim against the United States under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after the Keystone XL pipeline was originally 
denied approval.3 In 2019, Westmoreland Coal sued Canada for $470 million, also under 
NAFTA, as a result of the state of Alberta’s policy to phase out coal-power by 2030.4  
The threat or risk of such claims against Australia, even if unlikely to succeed or lead to large 
damages, nevertheless gives foreign investors unwarranted and excessive leverage to influence 
climate change policy in Australia.5 One way to address this risk is simply to terminate the 
existing BITs. As discussed in section 4 below, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether BITs 
in fact positively impact foreign direct investment flows. Alternatively, Australia’s existing 
BITs could be renegotiated to include appropriate safeguards against such claims. 
3. Clauses that should be included in a renegotiated agreement 
As noted in the Discussion Paper, FTAs negotiated by Australia in recent years contain clauses 
aimed at safeguarding the Australian government’s right to regulate. The investment chapter 











of the Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA),6 for example, contains the following 
clauses: 
Article 8.16: Investment and Environmental, Health and other Regulatory Objectives 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in 
a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives. 
Article 8.18: General Exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments or 
between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or investment, 
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a 
Party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(b) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Chapter; 
(c) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; or 
(d) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
The Parties understand that the measures referred to in subparagraph 1(a) include 
environmental measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that the 
measures referred to in subparagraph 1(d) include environmental measures relating to 
the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
Any future renegotiated agreements entered into by Australia should include such clauses. Any 
general exceptions clause should explicitly clarify that the measures it refers to include 
measures relating to climate change. An alternative approach is to include specific exceptions 
to particular protection standards, for example by clarifying that regulatory measures, including 
those relating to climate change, will not amount to indirect expropriation or unfair treatment 
provided that they are not applied in a discriminatory manner. 
Such clauses will not, however, remove entirely the risk of claims challenging climate 
measures, even if such claims would be unlikely to be successful. After all, investment 
tribunals never negated the theoretical possibility of host-states taking measures to protect 
certain public goods and interests, but rather have placed strict, ad hoc and often unpredictable 





limitations on their ability to do so.7 Investors could still bring speculative claims that Australia 
would have to defend. The Discussion Paper notes that Australia’s modern FTA practice has 
involved excluding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims against public health 
measures. Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as incorporated by the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, gives states the 
power to prevent investors from bringing claims challenging a tobacco control measure under 
the TPP’s investment chapter.8 Article 14.21(1)(b) of the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement also excludes ISDS claims ‘in relation to a measure that is 
designed and implemented to protect or promote public health’.9 This submission therefore 
also proposes that renegotiated BITs similarly carve out claims challenging climate change 
measures from ISDS. 
Alternatively, renegotiated BITs could exclude ISDS entirely. Although this would be a 
departure from previous practice, as discussed in the next section, there are significant 
arguments that support this approach. First, the evidence that there is positive correlation 
between investment inflow and ISDS is at best inconclusive. Secondly, ISDS accords — by 
definition — a stronger negotiating position to foreign investors as opposed to the legal and 
political position of domestic investors, Indigenous peoples, the scientific community, etc. 
4. The impact of BITs 
4.1 On the flow of foreign direct investment 
Terminating BITs or renegotiating them to limit or exclude ISDS is not necessarily going to 
have any impact on flows of foreign direct investment into Australia since it is not clear that 
there is any causal relationship between BITs or more specifically ISDS and increased foreign 
direct investment. Australia is considered a low-risk country in which to invest,10 and there are 
other options for investors to protect against themselves, such as domestic courts, investment 
guarantees and political risk insurance. This submission only considers the relationship 
between BITs and foreign direct investment generally, rather than commenting on Australia’s 
specific existing BITs. 
A 2017 review of 35 quantitative studies of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment 
flows found mixed results.11 While a majority of studies found that BITs had a positive impact 
on foreign direct investment flows in at least some circumstances and to some extent, a 
‘sizeable minority’ found no effect. Furthermore, the quality of studies varied. Jonathan 














Bonnitcha and Emma Aisbett have argued that those studies that better accounted for the fact 
that two countries may have negotiated a BIT because of an increase in foreign direct 
investment flows between them and the fact that countries may enter into a BIT at the same 
time as adopting other measures to encourage foreign direct investment tended to find no causal 
link between BITs and an increase in foreign direct investment.12 Furthermore, the 2017 review 
also noted three recent studies that have found that BITs providing for ISDS do not lead to an 
increase in foreign direct investment flows any more than those which do not contain such 
provisions.13 
4.2 On the position of foreign investors in political deliberation and legal reform 
We note the fact that in its 2016 report on its inquiry into the TPP agreement, the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties observed that ‘the evidence for regulatory chill is anecdotal’.14 
However, it is a matter of fact that, regardless of its systemic effects, ISDS gives foreign 
investors a privileged legal and political position that other economic and political actors lack. 
We contend that in a liberal democracy this is a problem in its own right and regardless of its 
tangible effects (which can be, of course, further aggravating factors). The promotion and 
protection of foreign direct investment has often been justified as a factor that leads to 
development. However, as Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis has noted, ISDS means that foreign investors 
have no reason to care about the existence of a functional judicial system in the host-state. If 
anything, they could benefit from dysfunction and corruption if it is directed against their wage-
seeking employees, or those who oppose their investment, while at the same time avoid the 
negative effects of such dysfunctions when it comes to protecting their own interests.15 Given 
Australia’s role as a major developmental partner in the Asia-Pacific it is doubtful whether the 
continuing adopting of such an anti-developmental measure is morally justifiable or 
(geo)politically smart. 
Relatedly, we contend that regardless of its outcomes, ISDS gives foreign investors a seat at 
the table of political deliberation that no other actor occupies. Through ISDS, one type of 
participant in the political and legal process has the privilege of bypassing entirely this process 
as well as domestic courts in order to enforce their preferences. If we examine the history of 



















international investment law, we easily realise that this is a feature and not a bug of ISDS as a 
whole, which was designed in order to give foreign investors legal and political privileges that 
go beyond national legislation and, importantly, national political processes.16 Given the 
explosive nature of economic inequality in the early twenty-first century such provisions are 
likely to both further exacerbate material inequality and to further undermine trust in the 
political and legal system opening up space for populist-nativist forces that seek to undo 
international economic integration as a whole. At the very least, political debate should not 
take ISDS for granted and demand that opponents make a case against such provisions. Rather, 
the burden of proof falls squarely on the shoulders of the defenders of the institution, especially 
given its lax relationship to investment inflows and the tensions between a two-tier justice 
system and the basic tenets of liberal democracy. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the above we put forward three recommendations: 
1) Australia should terminate its existing BITs. 
2) Alternatively, Australia should renegotiate its existing BITs so as to exclude ISDS 
either entirely or in respect of claims challenging climate change measures. 
3) If Australia decides to maintain ISDS clauses in renegotiated BITs, it should introduce 
clauses that explicitly guarantee the right to regulate both in general and in regards to 
particular areas, including public health and, notably, climate change. 
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